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Fluency in a second language is considered important by both learners and 
teachers, but is not well understood. This paper describes what is known about 
second language fluency and describes a number of psychological learning 
mechanisms that might explain how fluency develops. These include the 
mechanisms underlying the contrast between automatic and controlled processing, 
the learning mechanisms postulated within Anderson's ACT"' theory of cognition, 
Bialystok's conception of the control dimension of language development, the 
notion of restructuring, recent proposals for the redefinition of automaticity as 
retrieval from memory, both instance and strength versions, and chunking 
theories. The paper concludes with some suggestions for research into the 
development of second language fluency itself that can fill gaps in existing 
knowledge and reduce our dependence on other fields for explanatory principles, 
while contributing simultaneously to discussion of the mechanisms responsible for 
skill development in general. 
The Phenomenon of Fluency 
''Fluenf' and "fluency'' are frequently used as non-technical terms and have a 
number of meanings that should be sorted out. With respect to native 
language fluency, Fillmore (1979) identified four different things we might 
have in mind when identifying someone as a particularly fluent speaker. First, 
we might be thinking of a speaker who easily fills time with talk, a fast talker 
(Kuiper & Tillis, 1986) such as a disk jockey, a sports announcer, or a 
conversational partner who hardly lets us get a word in edgewise. Second, we 
might have the quality of speech more in mind than quantity and might mean 
by a fluent speaker one whose speech is coherent, complex and dense (Fillmore 
gives Noam Chomsky as an example of this kind of fluent speaker). We might 
also consider someone to be especially fluent if they always seem to know the 
appropriate thing to say in a wide variety of contexts, identifying fluency with 
pragmatic and affective skills. Finally, Fillmore points out, we may focus on 
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speakers with exceptional control over the aesthetic functions of language, 
including creativity and imagination, punning, joking, the creation of 
metaphors, and so on. 
When considering fluency with respect to nonnative learners of a 
language, we might also have any of these things in mind. We often use 
fluency as a rough synonym for global ability (Lennon, 1990), as when 
someone says "My friend speaks four languages fluently." In such cases we 
usually mean only that our friend speaks those languages well, without 
meaning to differentiate among the ways that "well" could be specified. In this 
paper, I will not be concerned with such a global conception of fluency, which 
appears to differ little from the concept of "proficiency," but will restrict the 
term in two ways: 
(1) A contrast is often made in the second language literature between fluency 
and accuracy, knowledge, or developmental stage (Brumfit, 1984). It seems 
natural to say about some learners that "X really knows quite a lot of English, 
but doesn't speak it fluently" or that "Y speaks fluently but not very 
grammatically." An extreme case would be the speaker of a pidginized 
interlanguage, largely unanalyzed and agrammatic with respect to the target 
language, who speaks that variety in a fluid rather than a halting manner 
(Schumann, 1990). Such a speaker is not fluent under a global proficiency 
definition, but can be called fluent if we identify fluency with the processing of 
language in real time, rather than with language as the object of knowledge. It 
is this conception of fluency as a primarily temporal phenomenon that I will 
take as the basic definition for foreign and second language learning. 
(2) Although there is a substantial body of literature on factors related to 
fluency in receptive processes (Segalowitz, 1991), I will also restrict the 
discussion of fluency to the productive processes involved in the planning and 
delivery of speech. It is certainly possible to speak of fluent listeners, readers 
and writers as well as speakers. Speed and ease of processing are probably 
common components of fluency across modalities, but other implied contrasts 
(if any) between "fluenf' and simply "good'' or "proficient'' listeners, readers 
or writers are less clear.l 
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My own preferred label for fluency in speech production is automatic 
procedural skill (Carlson, Sullivan, & Schneider, 1989). Fluent speech is 
automatic, not requiring much attention or effort, and is characterized by the 
fact that "the psycholinguistic processes of speech planning and speech 
production are functioning easily and efficiently" (Lennon, 1990, p.391). 
Nonfluent speech is effortful and requires a great deal of attention, so that 
nonfluent speakers exhibit many hesitations and other manifestations of 
groping for words and attempting to combine them into utterances. Fluency 
depends on procedural knowledge (Fcerch & Kasper, 1984), knowing how to 
do something, rather than declarative knowledge, or knowledge about 
something. Finally, if a distinction is to be made between procedural 
knowledge and procedural skill (many writers have written about the contrast 
with declarative knowledge, but none have been particularly concerned with 
this particular contrast), I prefer to identify fluency with skill rather than 
knowledge, again emphasizing the performance aspect of actually doing 
something in real time rather than the knowledge of how something is to be 
done. 
Comments by learners provide support for a conception of second 
language fluency as a performance phenomenon with particular emphasis on 
its temporal aspects (Lennon, 1989), as do proposals concerning the empirical 
correlates of fluency. Mohle (1984) has suggested speech rate, the length and 
positioning of silent pauses, the length of fluent speech runs between pauses, 
the frequency and distribution of filled pauses, and the frequency of repetitions 
and self-corrections as possible measures of fluency. While I take a speaker-
based perspective on the concept of fluency, assuming that fluency rests upon 
a definable bundle of production processes, there is also evidence that these 
factors influence hearer-based impressions of fluency. In two recent studies, 
Lennon (1990) and Riggenbach (in press) had native speaking judges rate non-
native speech samples for fluency and then investigated quantifiable 
1 Sincoff and Sternberg (1987) have argued that whereas reading and listening draw 
primarily on "verbal comprehension," speaking and writing require "verbal fluency." 
Comprehension and fluency are seen as different though related abilities. I am grateful to an 
anonymous SSLA reviewer for calling this reference to my attention. 
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performance features in those samples that might function as objective 
indicators of oral fluency. Lennon analyzed the speech of four female West 
German university students, advanced learners of English, all of whom were 
judged to have improved in fluency between the beginning and the end of six 
months' residence in Britain. Twelve variables were assessed, and statistically 
significant improvement across subjects was found for three of them: faster 
speech rate, fewer filled pauses per t~unit, and fewer t-units followed by pause. 
Lennon also noted that there were individual differences among the four 
subjects, indicating that the perception of fluency on the part of listeners may 
not always be based on the same speech characteristics. Self-corrections 
proved to be a poor fluency indicator across subjects, but other variables that 
did not show statistically significant changes in this limited study deserve 
further investigation with larger subject samples as possible indicators of 
fluency. Using a cross-sectional design, Riggenbach investigated the speech of 
six Chinese learners of English, three of whom were rated "very fluent'' and 
three of whom were rated 11Very non-fluent'' by 12 judges. Riggenbach 
compared these learners on 19 variables, including hesitation and repair 
phenomena, speech rate, and a number of interactive discourse measures. Few 
significant differences were found, but the fluent and non-fluent learners were 
significantly different with respect to speech rate and the number of unfilled 
pauses. Like Lennon, Riggenbach found that repair frequency was not a a 
factor influencing fluency judgments, and also stresses the fact that individual 
learners had different fluency profiles. One learner in particular was more like 
the fluent speakers in terms of rate and amowtt of speech but was rated non-
fluent because of the agrammaticality of her speech, suggesting that hearer-
based impressions of fluency are holistic, influenced by considerations of 
accuracy as well as by the temporal, performance aspects on which I will focus 
in this paper. 
Psychological Learning Mechanisms 
Identifying second language fluency with automatic procedural skill provides 
a label that accords reasonably well with nontechnical conceptions of the 
phenomenon and with some empirically identifiable components of speech 
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judged to be fluent, but says nothing about how fluency develops. However, a 
number of learning mechanisms for the development of cognitive skills in 
general have been proposed in the psychological literature, several of which 
have been cited in the second language literature as plausible explanations for 
the development of fluency. These include the mechanisms underlying the 
notion of automaticity as developed by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) and 
applied to U learning by Levelt (1977) and by McLaughlin, Rossman, and 
McLeod (1983); the mechanisms of proceduralization, composition, 
generalization, discrimination and strengthening proposed in Anderson's 
ACP theory of cognition (Anderson, 1982, 1983); Bialystok's dimension of 
11COntrol" (Bialystok, 1990a, 1990b); the notion of restructuring as developed by 
Cheng (1985) in psychology and applied to L2learning by McLaughlin (1990); 
recent proposals for the redefinition of automaticity as retrieval from memory, 
in both instance theory (Logan, 1988a, 1991; Logan & Stadler, 1991) and 
associative strength theories (MacKay, 1982; Schneider, 1985); and chunking 
theories (Newell, 1990; Servan-Schreiber & Anderson, 1990). I will discuss each 
of these proposals in turn, first presenting and explaining the theoretical 
constructs and the proposed learning mechanisms, next considering how the 
theory has been or could be applied in the field of SLA, and finally providing 
an evaluation of the proposed mechanisms in terms of both their current status 
within cognitive psychology and their relevance to our understanding of 
second language fluency and how it develops. 
Automatic and controlled processing 
The distinction between controlled and automatic processing, originally 
conceived as a dichotomy between two qualitatively different forms of 
processing, has been a major topic in psychology. The theoretical contrast 
parallels the easily confirmable subjective experience that some skills and 
mental activities seem to require our full attention, while others seem to 
require little or no attention or effort. The most important properties of 
automatic processing are generally considered to be that it is (1) fast and 
efficient, (2) effortless, (3) not limited by short term memory capacity, (4) not 
under voluntary control, (5) difficult to modify or inhibit, and (6) unavailable 
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to introspection. Automatic processes typically occur in well-practiced tasks, 
and are held to be responsible for skilled performance and most of the details 
of cognitive processing. In contrast, controlled processing is (1) slow and 
inefficient, (2) effortful, (3) limited by the capacity of short term memory, (4) 
largely under subject control, (5) flexible, and (6) at least partly accessible to 
introspection. Controlled processing serves such functions as maintaining 
goals in working memory and applying general procedures to new 
circumstances, and it typically occurs in novel and inconsistent processing 
tasks. The development of skilled behavior involves a shift with practice from 
controlled to automatic processing. Novices of all kinds, including beginning 
second language learners, must pay careful attention to every step in the 
procedure, while experts do not. For further discussion of the basic contrasts 
between controlled and automatic processing, readers are referred to Hasher & 
Zacks (1979), LaBerge (1981), Logan (1991), Logan and Stadler (1991), Posner 
and Snyder (1975}, Schneider (1985), Schneider and Detweiler (1988), 
Schneider, Dumais, and Shiffrin (1984), and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977}. 
The most frequently cited theory of the development of automatic 
processing is that of Shiffrin and Schneider (1977}, based on experiments 
involving the detection of target letter stimuli presented in a field of 
distractors. Comparing the development of this skill when target mappings 
were varied (presumably calling on controlled processing, because subjects had 
to activate a different memory set relating particular letters to "yes" and "no" 
responses on every trial) with conditions in which mappings were held 
constant, Shiffrin and Schneider found that only the latter condition led to 
automatic processing with practice. Performance under the consistent 
mapping condition exhibited two of the defining characteristics of 
automaticity: once a task is automatized, attentional resources are freed to 
perform other tasks concurrently (e.g.carrying on a conversation while 
performing the visual search task}, and automatic processes also occur even 
when subjects consciously try to prevent them. In the Shiffrin and Schneider 
model, controlled processing utilizes temporary sequences of nodes activated 
under attentional control. Automatic processing involves sequences of nodes 
in memory that nearly always become active in response to a particular input 
configuration. Both the associative links between stimulus and response and 
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the links among steps of the response process can be automatized, so that 
attention is required for neither the initiation of a fully automatic response nor 
its completion. 
The mechanism considered responsible for the development of automatic 
responses is strengthening of the connections among nodes, as a result of 
repeated exposure and rehearsal (association learning). This model does not 
assume that the structure of the response is modified in any way, only that it 
runs off more rapidly. Since strengthening is a purely a process-improvement 
mechanism, it is not adequate (nor is it intended) as an explanation for cases in 
which development is manifested by new or modified responses to a particular 
input configuration. 
Shiffrin and Schneider's view of the contrast between controlled and 
automatic processing has a number of possible implications for second 
language learning, several of which were identified by McLaughlin, Rossman 
and McLeod (1983): 
1. Complex skills such as those involved in language learning are learned 
and become automatic only after the earlier use of controlled processes. 
2. Since speaking is a complex cognitive task with hierarchical task 
structure (involving discoursal, pragmatic, syntactic and lexical choices), each 
component requires more or less attention depending on how well-learned it 
is. The development of new skills is possible only when other task demands 
are minimized. 
McLaughlin, Rossman and McLeod were concerned with introducing an 
information-processing perspective to the second language field in general 
terms, not with the particular problem of fluency. They identified the task of 
understanding second language learning in information processing terms with 
the need to formulate a component skills analysis in which the processing skills 
that make up the task of learning a second language are identified, with 
particular attention to those skills contributing to individual variation and 
overall success. However, to the extent that McLaughlin, Rossman and 
McLeod were concerned with fluency, they linked fluency with automatic 
processing, reporting that one difference between fluent and nonfluent 
bilinguals is the degree of automatization of lexical processing and citing 
studies showing that fluent second language learners exhibit some of the 
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hallmarks of automatic processing (speed and the reallocation of attention) 
more than novice learners. 
The automatization of second language processes is a useful concept for 
understanding second language fluency. The point has been made frequently 
that speech is possible at a normal rate only when most of the procedures 
involved have been automatized (de Bot, in press; Levelt, 1979, 1989; Rehbein, 
1987; Sajavaara, 1987). Practice seems to be the necessary condition for fluency 
in a second language, and this is given a theoretical justification in models of 
automatization. Such characteristics of L2 fluency as speech rate and the 
length of fluent runs between pauses may reflect automaticity fairly directly, 
while other aspects of fluency may reflect the fact that virtually all complex 
tasks require a mixture of automatic and controlled processes, usually 
organized in a systematic network or hierarchy (Levelt, 1977, 1989; Schneider, 
Dumais, & Shiffrin, 1984). 
However, a number of objections have been raised against the concept of 
automaticity as formulated in the Shiffrin and Schneider model. These include 
theoretical and empirical questions concerning the single-capacity view of 
attention which underlies the theory (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Wickens, 
1984), disagreement with the claim that automatic processing is free of 
attentionallimitations (Cheng, 1985; Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990), 
challenges to the notion that automatization reflects the withdrawal of 
attention {Hirst, Spelke, Reaves, Caharack, & Neisser, 1980; Logan, 1988a), and 
competing views of the contrast between automatic and controlled processing 
as a dichotomy or a continuum {Strayer & Kramer, 1990). Schneider and 
Detweiler {1988) have proposed a revised model in which automatization is 
viewed as a gradual, continuous transition through five identifiable phases: 
controlled comparison from buffered memory {fully controlled processing), 
context-maintained controlled comparison, goal-state-maintained controlled 
comparison, controlled assist of automatic processing, and fully automatic 
processing. The five stage model suggests that even for completely fluent 
native speakers, some processes may remain at the stages of controlled 
comparison or controlled assist of automatic processing. Examples might be 
subject-verb agreement, especially when subject and verb are separated by 
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intervening linguistic material, the who/whom distinction, and many other 
normative aspects of language. Unfortunately, Schneider and Detweiler 
provide precise definitions of the phases of automatization only with reference 
to specific laboratory tasks, so extensions to natural language performance can 
only be metaphorical. 
Shiffrin and Schneider were more concerned with describing the 
characteristics of controlled and automatic processing than with how it 
develops, and their discussion of learning mechanisms is under-developed. 
Most of the theories to be discussed in the remainder of this section can be seen 
as attempts to flesh out the basic contrast between automatic and controlled 
processing with more detailed specification of the learning mechanisms 
responsible for automatization. 
ACT-
John Anderson has proposed a multi-stage, multi-mechanism theory of 
the acquisition of cognitive skills (Anderson, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1989), 
referred to as ACT* (pronounced "act-star''). According to Anderson, the first 
stage of skill development relies on declarative (propositional) knowledge. 
Facts about how a skill is performed are maintained in working memory and 
are used interpretively by general-purpose productions (IF-THEN rule-
statements), which are flexible but which carry heavy costs in terms of time 
and working memory space. The declarative stage of skill in Anderson's 
theory is equivalent in most respects to controlled processing in the Shiffrin 
and Schneider theory. A straightforward example is the case of classroom 
learning in which a student is told a rule of the second language, for example, a 
rule concerning tense inflection, and then carries out a drill requiring that a 
number of verbs be inflected using the rule. This would be an equally good 
example of Krashen' s notion of the conscious application of a rule of language 
(Krashen, 1981), although Anderson's model is incompatible with Krashen's 
position that there is no interface between conscious learning and subconscious 
acquisition (Krashen, 1985). Since Anderson maintains that knowledge in a 
new domain always starts out in declarative form and is used interpretively, 
this initial stage must also encompass examples in which learners produce 
linguistic forms by self-discovered rules of thumb or by analogy with known 
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forms. If working memory and consciousness are assumed to be roughly 
equivalent (Baars, 1988; Kihlstrom, 1984; Schmidt , 1990), then language 
learners and users ought to be able to report many of the details of this 
declarative stage. 
The second stage of skill acquisition is a procedural stage, in which 
knowledge is directly embedded in procedures for performing the skill. The 
procedural stage of skill acquisition is roughly equivalent to automatic 
processing in the Shiffrin and Schneider model, but Anderson offers more 
detail concerning how it may develop. Anderson outlines two general 
processes in the development of procedural knowledge: knowledge 
compilation, by which the skill moves from the declarative to the procedural 
stage, and tuning, through which productions become more selective in their 
range of applications. Five learning mechanisms are proposed to explain these 
changes. 
The mechanisms of knowledge compilation are composition and 
proceduralization. Composition refers to the collapsing of sequences of 
productions into macroproductions, prepackaged sequences, or chunks (Miller, 
1956, 1958). One does not normally remember a social security number as 
018305267, for example, but as 018-30-5267. Telephone and credit card account 
numbers are other examples in which long numerical sequences are pre-
chunked by their issuers for easier processing. Proceduralization, the other 
mechanism of knowledge compilation, refers to the embedding of factual 
knowledge into productions so that the products of frequently executed 
productions can be retrieved directly from memory and declarative knowledge 
does not need to be activated in working memory for their execution. It is not 
uncommon for declarative knowledge either to be lost (this assumes that 
memory traces decay, which is controversial) or simply to be no longer 
retrievable after proceduralization is complete. We can often drive or walk 
familiar routes more accurately than we can give directions to others on how to 
do so; skilled typists may have better kinesthetic than verbal control over 
spelling; and foreign language learners may be able to retrieve the products of 
frequently used productions even when they cannot remember anything about 
the declarative knowledge that was presumably used to guide such 
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productions initially {Sharwood Smith, 1981). 
The mechanisms that contribute to the fine tuning of procedural 
knowledge in Anderson's theory are generalization, discrimination, and 
strengthening. Both generalization, by which rules become broader in scope, 
and discrimination, which narrows the scope of rule application (Anderson, 
1982; Klahr, 1984; Reese, 1989), have obvious examples in language learning. 
The mechanism of strengthening, by which better rules are strengthened and 
poorer rules are weakened, leading eventually to rule replacement, appears 
equally relevant to second language learning. It should be noted that the 
mechanism of strengthening proposed in Anderson's ACT- model is somewhat 
different from the mechanism of strengthening discussed above with reference 
to the Shiffrin and Schneider theory of controlled and automatic processing, 
since strengthening in Anderson's model affects only the likelihood of a 
procedure or rule being selected, not the strength of associations among the 
elements of a response or procedure. 
Anderson has offered a detailed and powerful theory of cognition in 
general which has considerable appeal as a model of second language skill. 
Hulstijn {1990) points out that the more sub-procedures get subsumed into 
overall procedures {by the composition mechanism), 11the more language use 
can be said to take place fluently and automatically, requiring less attention" 
(Hulstijn, 1990, p.32). However, the acquisition of language skills is not limited 
to the speeding up of the same procedures originally formed from declarative 
knowledge, but also the establishment of new procedures which reorganize 
previously acquired rules and procedures. Anderson's model can account for 
this {whereas the Shiffrin and Schneider model of automatization cannot) 
because it is a self-modifying production system that includes mechanisms that 
change productions {generalization and discrimination), rather than only 
mechanisms responsible for the running off of productions (Reese, 1989). The 
Anderson model thus relates to broader concerns than the development of 
fluency in a narrow sense, but even if we maintain our limited concept of 
fluency in terms of the temporal aspects of skill, Anderson's mechanisms all 
seem to contribute to fluency, though in rather different ways. Composition 
results in processing speedup through the unitary application of procedures. 
Schneider and Detweiler (1988) point out that under certain postulated fixed 
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times for the encoding, decoding and transmission of information, a copy 
typist using sequential transmission (e.g. transmitting the letter pattern TiiE to 
the fingers as T, H, and E) would average 50 wpm. By transmitting the same 
information in parallel (transmitting T,H, and E simultaneously across the 
visual-motor loop), the same typist would average 60 wpm, and using chunk 
transmission and decoding (transmitting the chunk THE from a single visual 
module to a single motor module and then decoding the motor chunk into its 
components) the same typist would average 100 wpm. Proceduralization also 
contributes to speed of processing, because working memory demands are 
reduced and the system can simultaneously perform other tasks that make 
demands on working memory. It is harder to make predictions concerning the 
temporal effects of the mechanisms of generalization and discrimination, and 
these are both included in the theory primarily because of their effects on 
accuracy and development (changes in the representation of linguistic 
knowledge rather than access to that knowledge), but both may also produce 
speedup through what Anderson calls ''algorithmic improvement'' (Anderson, 
1982, p. 398). Strengthening also has a major influence on timing because it 
reduces the time it takes for a production rule to be selected. 
It may be possible to relate specific mechanisms from Anderson's theory 
to specific aspects of second language fluency (such as Lennon's empirical 
correlates of perceived fluency, discussed above), although this has not yet 
been attempted. Anderson has illustrated the operation of his theory with 
respect to L1 acquisition phenomena (Anderson, 1980), but the examples 
presented have more to do with the types of rules that function in acquisition 
than with fluency factors. 
There are disadvantages as well as strengths in multimechanism theories. 
Bialystok has objected to Anderson's model on the grounds that it conflates the 
representation of knowledge with access to that knowledge (Bialystok & 
Bouchard Ryan, 1985), two dimensions that should be kept separate for both 
theoretical and methodological reasons. In addition, as Carlson and Schneider 
(1990) have noted, ACT* mechanisms often compete with each other. 
Composition speeds processing, but at the same time the complexity of the 
composed productions slows production, negating the effect of composition 
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(Carlson & Schneider, 1990). The postulated existence of both cooperating and 
competing mechanisms makes the theory difficult to falsify. 
Executive control 
Whereas McLaughlin, Rossman and McLeod have drawn the attention of 
second language theorists to the Shiffrin and Schneider contrast between 
automatic and controlled processing and Hulstijn has drawn upon Anderson's 
model to illuminate the development of procedural skill in a second language, 
Bialystok has carried the discussion of fluency in other directions. For some 
time, Bialystok has advocated a model of second language development that 
rests upon a two dimensional framework (Bialystok, 1982, 1985, 1990a, 1990b; 
Bialystok & Bouchard Ryan, 1985; Bialystok & Sharwood Smith, 1985). The 
first of these dimensions, that of analysis, has to do with the ways in which 
linguistic knowledge is represented cognitively and the ways in which 
representations change in the course of linguistic development. This 
component involves the progressive development of a knowledge system 
which is initially implicit in the mind of the learner but which gradually 
becomes both more explicit and more organized formally, a crucial 
development for advanced language skills such as literacy. (A similar view of 
first language development has been advanced by Karmiloff-Smith, 1986.) In 
my view (and apparently also in Bialystok's), the analysis dimension of the 
model is not relevant to an understanding of second language fluency, so it 
will not be discussed further here. 
The second dimension of Bialystok's model, control, concerns the use of 
linguistic knowledge and is assigned the task of accounting for access to 
linguistic knowledge (whether analyzed or unanalyzed) and describing the 
cognitive demands that language tasks place upon learners. The 
characterization of this dimension has evolved in Bialystok's thinking. In the 
1982 version, it was labeled the "automatic factor," and the achievement of 
automatic access to the information represented by the analyzed dimension 
was seen as the essence of development on this dimension (Bialystok, 1982: 
183). In more recent versions, the concept of control has been broadened 
beyond that of automaticity, and refers to the ability to select, coordinate and 
integrate relevant information in real time, the key to which is the "ability to 
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intentionally focus attention on relevant parts of a problem to arrive at a 
solution" (Bialystok & Mitterer, 1987, p. 148). For Bialystok, fluency is an 
outcome of development along the dimension of control: 
Since control of processing is constrained by real time, effective 
control processes confer the impression of fluency or automaticity 
upon performance. . .. fluency is considered to be an emergent 
property of high levels of control. Skilled selective attention, that is, 
creates a performance that appears automatic and effortless. 
(Bialystok, 1990a, p.125, emphasis mine) 
For Bialystok, the direction of development is from low to high levels of 
control. Hulstijn (1990) has found this objectionable, commenting that 
development must proceed from high control to low control, but this 
disagreement is largely a question of terminology and perspective. Hulstijn's 
argument is the traditional one that the developmental path towards fluency 
for each particular procedure is from controlled processing (requiring 
attentional supervision) to automatic processing (either requiring no 
attentional control or less attentional control). However, if the focus is on 
control processes themselves, including not only the selective allocation of 
attention but also more specific control processes such as rehearsal, search, 
planning (Crookes, 1989), monitoring (Morrison & Low, 1983), and decision 
making of all kinds (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), then it is reasonable to speak 
of development in the direction of higher (i.e. increasingly skillful) levels of 
control over a skill or its components. ''Higher" levels of control may also refer 
to the level of organization to which attention is directed. 
In addition, at least a partial shift in focus away from automaticity 
towards efficient self-regulation as an essential characteristic of fluency is 
justified by the fact that skilled performance requires a balance between the 
speed of automatic processing and the goal-directedness of controlled 
processing. Stillings, Feinstein, Garfield, Rissland, Rosenbaum, Weisler and 
Baker-Ward (1987) have pointed out that "a system that acted only by allowing 
the currently most active automatic procedure to carry through to completion 
without any influence by goals would be incoherently impulsive" (Stillings et 
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al., 1987, p. 59). A great deal of empirical data suggest that automatic processes 
(indeed, all cognitive processes) are subject to attentional control to some 
degree (Cheng, 1985; Cohen, Dunbar & McClelland, 1990). Fluency can validly 
be described as the control of mostly automatic processes by selective attention 
in the service of intentional goals (Bialystok's point), although determination of 
the mechanisms by which automatic and controlled, goalwdirected behaviors 
are coordinated remains a difficult problem (Phillips & Hughes, 1988). 
This model also has a number of weaknesses in its ability to provide an 
explanation for second language fluency. Following Jackendoff (1987), 
Bialystok (1990b) has argued that automaticity is epiphenomenal. However, 
while automaticity may not be the only explanation for L2 fluency, it or some 
substitute must be part of any such explanation, and Bialystok has 
acknowledged that automaticity must be incorporated "somehow and 
somewhere" within the dimension of control (Ellen Bialystok, personal 
communication, July 17, 1991). The model might be improved by reference to 
psychological theories that have attempted to describe the details of executive 
control structures while recognizing that intentional control by itself is too slow 
and unwieldy to provide the precision and timing needed to perform skilled 
acts and that one reason automatic processes are important is that they can be 
harnessed to provide information relevant to a person's goals (Cohen, Dunbar, 
& McClelland, 1990; Logan, 1988a; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Phillips & 
Hughes, 1988; Reason, 1984; Schneider & Detweiler, 1988; Shallice, 1978). 
Levell's model of speech production (Levelt 1989) is equally relevant here. 
Levelt argues that speaking is usually an intentional activity, serving purposes 
that speakers want to realize, and is thus under executive control, but in order 
for control to be allocated where it is needed (primarily at the conceptual level), 
virtually all low level components (including the selection of grammatical 
structures, retrieval of lexical items and the formulation of articulatory plans) 
must be largely automatic if fluent speech is to result (Levelt,1989, pp. 2G-22). 
It may be possible to elaborate a theory in which it is made explicit how 
skilled selective attention develops and produces the impression of both 
automaticity and fluency, but Bialystok has not yet provided this level of 
detail. From the perspective of the concerns raised in this paper, the major 
weakness of the model is that it contains no learning mechanisms. Selective 
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attention, identified as the main processing mechanism for the dimension of 
control, is said to develop as the result of age, experience, practice, and 
bilingualism, but there is no attempt at an explanation of how this comes 
about. 
Restructuring 
Cheng (1985) introduced the notion of restructuring (a process-switching 
mechanism) as an alternative to that of automaticity (process-improvement) for 
the explanation of skilled performance. Cheng argued that the results of the 
Shiffrin and Schneider experiments did not require an explanation in terms of a 
dichotomy between controlled and automatic processes, because other 
explanations were readily available: 
In particular, [improved performance] can be due to a 
restructuring of the task components so that they are coordinated, 
integrated, or reorganized into new perceptual, cognitive, or 
motor units, thereby allowing the procedure involving the old 
components to be replaced by a more efficient procedure 
involving the new components. (Cheng, 1985, p.414) 
Cheng used a simple analogy to illustrate her point. One way to find the 
sum of ten 2's is to perform nine addition operations. But anyone who has 
learned the multiplication table can solve the same problem by looking up the 
entry for 2 X 10 in memory. Remembering the answer is faster and more 
efficient than performing nine addition operations, but the gain in efficiency is 
not accomplished by a speed-up of the addition process, or even through an 
automatic process of multiplication (no operation is performed other than 
retrieval from memory). Cheng claimed that consistent and variable mapping 
tasks, such as those carried out by Shiffrin and Schneider, cannot distinguish 
between shifts in modes of processing and the restructuring of task procedures, 
making automaticity a suspect concept. Schneider and Shiffrin (1985) 
responded to Cheng that restructuring was indeed a factor in improvement in 
such experiments but was insufficient to explain a number of key findings, for 
which the concept of automatization was still required. 
For second language learning, McLaughlin (1990) has taken a position 
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similar to Schneider and Shiffrin's, that both automaticity and restructuring are 
required concepts, citing Cheng's definition of restructuring as the 
coordination, integration and reorganization of task components resulting in 
more efficient procedures. McLaughlin cites discontinuities in linguistic 
development as the primary evidence for the interplay of automaticity and 
restructuring, discussing numerous cases of U-shaped behavior in which 
correct forms that have become automatic are replaced by over-regularized 
forms based on qualitative representational changes (restructuring) before the 
correct forms reappear. 
McLaughlin's and Cheng's conceptions of restructuring are alike in being 
concerned with shifts in the strategies used to carry out a cognitive skill and in 
defining restructuring in terms of changes in the organization of task 
components. However, there is an equally important difference between their 
interpretations of the concept that becomes apparent if one considers the 
specific examples of restructuring that are presented and discussed. Cheng 
emphasized the choice of more efficient strategies as an alternative to 
automatization, giving the shift from a series of addition processes to memory 
look-up as a basic example. McLaughlin's examples of restructuring in 
language learning all involve a shift away from memory and exemplar-based 
strategies, such as an early reliance on memorized formulas, to strategies based 
on more abstract, rule-based representations. 2 Following Karmiloff-Smith 
2 It could be argued that the concept of restructuring is incompatible with that of 
automaticity, if restructuring is viewed as development from implicit to explicit knowledge 
(from memory-based procedures to rule-based procedures) and automatization is viewed as 
development from explicit to implicit knowledge (Michael Long, personal communication). 
McLaughlin protects himself from this criticism by scrupulously avoiding any characterization 
of the controlled:automatic distinction in terms of knowledge types, but the conceptual 
problems involved in many discussions of explicit (or analyzed) and implicit (or unanalyzed) 
knowledge are evident in a dispute between Hulstijn and Bialystok. Hulstijn (1990) criticized 
Bialystok's model on the grounds that it permits development in only one direction, from 
unanalyzed to analyzed knowledge, arguing that the existence of second language learners 
who use explicit grammar rules as the starting point for the establishment of automatic 
routines provides sufficient evidence that language learning need not start with unanalyzed 
knowledge. Bialystok responded that language learning must indeed start with unanalyzed 
knowledge, that it is simply not possible for mental representations to become less analyzed 
(Bialystok, 1990b). One can only agree with Bialystok that knowledge, qua knowledge, 
cannot become less analyzed, while recognizing that Hulstijn's point has less to do with 
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(1986}, McLaughlin suggests that restructuring occurs when learners go 
beyond success: 110nce the procedures at any phase become automatized, 
consolidated, and function efficiently, learners step up to a 1metaprocedural' 
level, which generates representational change and restructuring" 
(McLaughlin, 1990, p.120). The shift from memory-based to rule-based 
representations is not motivated by processing considerations, and the 
establishment of complex internal representations is unlikely to result in faster, 
more efficient processing in the ways in which Cheng's prototypical strategy 
shifts do. 
It would be interesting to see whether knowledge restructuring in second 
language learning results in U-shaped behavior with respect to fluency 
indicators such as speech rate and pause distribution as well as accuracy 
measures. Although restructuring may result in ~~algorithmic improvement'~ in 
Anderson's sense, this is a difficult notion to pin down in any specific way, and 
the general principle that it is more efficient to remember than to compute (to 
be discussed in the next section} suggests that fluency as well as accuracy may 
follow a U-shaped curve, declining when restructured procedures are 
introduced and increasing again as the new procedures are routinized so that 
they can be drawn directly from memory. This has not been McLaughlin's 
concern, since he has identified restructuring with developmental stages and 
changes in linguistic representations. His position appears similar to earlier 
versions of Bialystok's model (Bialystok, 1982), that there are two partially 
independent though interacting dimensions to second language learning, one 
having to do with the development of fluency, attributed to automaticity, the 
other (McLaughlin's ,,restructuring," Bialystok's 11analysis11) having to do with 
the evolution of increasingly abstract representations of knowledge. Once 
restructuring has been re-defined in terms of representational changes, the 
concept gains relevance as a mechanism underlying the development of 
linguistic competence but has less relevance as a possible mechanism 
underlying the development of fluency. 
knowledge than with the issue of whether such knowledge is accessed and used in production, 
which is an empirical question rather than a logical one. 
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Instance theory 
In Cheng's discussion of restructuring, direct retrieval from memory was 
presented as an example of a strategy shift resulting in more efficient 
processing, and such strategy shifts were seen as suggesting that automaticity 
may be epiphenomenal. Logan (1985, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1991; Logan & Klapp, 
1991; Logan & Stadler, 1991) has developed a theory that recognizes 
automaticity as a real phenomenon to be accounted for, while arguing that 
that the principles determining the establishment and retrieval of memories 
provide a more satisfactory accounting of the properties of automaticity than 
do traditional accounts based on notions of attention and resource limitations. 
Logan's theory rests upon certain assumptions about how memories are 
established and retrieved: 
1. Encoding into memory is an obligatory, unavoidable consequence of 
attention, although the quality of the encoding depends on the quality and 
quantity of attention. Not all contextual details are represented in the memory 
trace; subjects only encode what they pay attention to. 
2. Retrieval from memory is an obligatory, unavoidable consequence of 
attention, although retrieval may not be easy and is not always successful-
practice and the match between context at encoding and context at retrieval are 
crucial. 
3. Each encounter with a stimulus is encoded, stored, and retrieved 
separately. 
In Logan's instance theory, the learning mechanism responsible for 
automaticity is memory-retrieval, or more precisely, the accumulation of 
separate episodic traces with experience that produces a gradual transition 
from algorithmic (rule-based) processing to memory-based processing: 
The theory assumes that novices begin with a general algorithm 
that is sufficient to perform the task. As they gain experience, 
they learn specific solutions to specific problems, which they 
retrieve when they encounter the same problems again. Then, 
they can respond with the solution retrieved from memory, or the 
one computed by the algorithm. At some point, they may gain 
enough experience to respond with a solution from memory on 
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every trial and abandon the algorithm entirely. At that point, 
their performance is automatic.3 {Logan, 1988a, p.493) 
Instance theory contrasts sharply with process-based models of the 
development of skill, including both the Shiffrin and Schneider {1977) model, 
which assumes that underlying processes do not change but simply run off 
more rapidly when automatized, and Anderson's ACT*, which attributes 
speedup to reductions in the amount of resources required {through 
proceduralization and algorithmic improvement) or the number of steps to be 
executed {through composition). In Logan's view, the underlying process (the 
algorithm) does not change and remains available to handle examples that 
have not been encountered before. The theory assumes that application of the 
algorithm does not speed up significantly or require less attention. Use of the 
algorithm is simply replaced over time by a much more efficient process, 
single-step memory retrieval. Output is determined by a race between the 
algorithm and memory retrieval, and memory retrieval becomes faster and 
faster as instances accumulate. Memory-retrieval dominates eventually, 
because the greater the number of instances in the race, the greater the 
probability that one of them will finish before the algorithm. 
Instance theory derives support from a number of experiments involving 
lexical decision tasks and alphabet arithmetic {Logan, 1988a). In the lexical 
decision experiment, most interesting because of the use of linguistic stimuli, 
subjects were presented with letter strings and were required to indicate as 
quickly as possible whether or not each was an English word. With practice, 
reaction times decreased substantially over blocks for the specific items 
practiced, while there was little evidence of a general practice effect which 
improved performance for new items, suggesting that subjects remembered 
their previous encounters with individual words and nonwords and 
apparently ruling out process-based theories that explain automatization in 
terms of general procedures that deal with new stimuli as effectively as old 
ones. 
3 Although Logan considers automatization to have been achieved when performance relies 
entirely on retrieval from memory, in a sense automatization is never complete, because each 
additional instance continues to have an effect on memory (Logan, 1988a). 
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Logan (1991) has provided arguments based on instance theory to account 
for the frequently cited properties of automaticity. Automatic processing is 
autonomous because memory encoding and retrieval are obligatory 
consequences of attention. It is harder to control than algorithm-based 
processing because the rapid finishing time of memory retrieval allows less 
time for an act of control to take effect. It is effortless when sufficient instances 
have been stored in memory to ensure easy retrieval, fast because memory 
retrieval is a single step process, and inaccessible to consciousness because 
memory retrieval does not have constituent processes that might be 
introspectable. 
Instance theory has not been discussed in the SLA literature, but its 
implications for our understanding of second language fluency are 
provocative, partly because they are strikingly different from conventional 
wisdom. Learners and teachers often assume that fluency rests upon 
"internalized rules," perhaps without giving much thought to how such rules 
might operate but generally assuming that some process of linguistic 
construction is going on out of reach of awareness. Linguistically based 
theories of speech production also assume that rules are operative as processes 
in some sense, for example the process of "formulating'' in the detailed model 
of speech production proposed by Levelt (1989). Pinker (1991) argues that both 
memory-based and rule-based processes play a role in speech production, but 
that rule-based production prevails whenever there is a sufficiently productive 
rule available; memory-based processing applies only to linguistic exceptions. 
In the spreading-activation model of sentence production proposed by Dell 
(1986, 1989), generative rules define sequences of categorically defined slots, 
which are then filled by items that have been retrieved from a lexical network. 
In this model, all inflected words (boys, singing, brought) and many derived 
words (genuineness, clearly) are also created by rule governed processes, 
assembled from morphemes during production (Dell, 1986). 
Instance theory suggests that morphological rules are not manipulated in 
the production of morphologically complex words unless the words are first-
time creations or have been produced so infrequently that memory traces are 
insufficient for direct retrieval. Instance theory also suggests that the retrieval 
of past solutions from memory may include complex forms at higher levels 
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than the word, including phrases and both completely formulaic and partly 
open clause structures. If memory is the basis of fluency, the conventional 
wisdom regarding the status of formulaic speech as a peripheral phenomenon 
in second language learning is therefore in serious need of revision. Instance 
theory provides theoretical support for the position of Pawley and Syder 
(1983), who argued that nativelike fluency is possible only because native 
speakers have memorized hundreds of thousands of morphologically complex 
lexical items, a considerable proportion of which consists of lexicalized 
sentence stems. For SLA, Widdowson (1989) has argued that the ability to use 
linguistic knowledge for communication depends less on the use of rules to 
assemble utterances from scratch than it does on having available a stock of 
partially pre-assembled patterns and formulaic frameworks, using rules 
primarily to make those adjustments to formulae that are necessary according 
to contextual demands. Gatbonton and Segalowitz (1988) and Arevart and 
Nation (1991) have advocated a number of classroom teaching techniques in 
harmony with instance theory, procedures designed to promote the 
automatization of specific utterances and utterance frames rather than the 
routinization of structures or rules. 
The major weakness of instance theory is that it cannot account for studies 
showing evidence of transfer of training or generalization in skill learning. 
Carlson, Sullivan, and Schneider (1989) have reported the results from 
experiments in which subjects practiced judgments about digital logic gates for 
over 8,000 trials. Results indicated that the organization of component 
processes and use of working memory remained constant while the speed of 
component processes increased and attentionalload decreased. Logan's own 
experiments have also produced some evidence of algorithm speed-up (Logan, 
1988a), and Logan & Stadler (1991) have reported on a series of memory search 
experiments in which some evidence was found for a category comparison 
strategy (Hintzman, 1986), beyond the effects that could be produced by 
instance-based learning. 
Strength theories 
Logan's claim that automatization relies upon instance learning, in which 
each encounter with a stimulus is represented separately in memory, is the 
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most controversial aspect of the theory. Other automaticity-as-memory 
theories rely on strengthening to account for retrieval from memory (Cohen, 
Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; MacKay, 1982; Schneider, 1985; Schneider & 
Detweiler, 1988). In strength theories, response representations do not 
accumulate, but connections between stimulus and response become 
progressively stronger with practice. Schneider has proposed a theory of 
automatization in visual search (Schneider, 1985; Schneider & Detweiler, 1988) 
that includes two kinds of learning, priority learning (responsible for response 
selection) and associative learning (responsible for the internal structure of 
responses). Within a connectionist-control architecture involving neural-like 
units at the micro level of processing, a common mechanism, proportional 
strengthening, is theorized to underlie both associative and priority learning. 
In a similar fashion, Cohen, Dunbar and McClelland (1990) have attempted to 
provide an explicit (although so far partial) account of the mechanisms 
underlying automaticity that can explain both its gradual development with 
practice and its relation to selective attention. The role of attention in this 
account is to select among competing processes on the basis of task 
instructions, and attention is conceived of as an additional source of input 
modulating interactions occurring at the intersections of pathways. 
Connectionist models are associative memory strength theories. 
McClelland & Rumelhart (1985) and Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland (1990) 
have argued that the problem of determining what counts as an instance in 
learning can be overcome through the use of distributed representations, in 
which memory for events is encoded neither as discrete instances nor as a 
single connection between a generic stimulus and a generic response, but in the 
strengths of a set of connections involving different units that are used to 
provide overlapping but nevertheless distinct representations. Within a 
connectionist model of language production, Sternberger (1985) proposed a 
resolution of an apparent paradox: morphologically complex words are 
analyzed by speakers of the language (i.e. their constituent parts are 
understood) and can be and often are produced by rule, but such forms are 
nonetheless lexicalized and need not be produced by rule. Sternberger 
suggested that analyzed units are organized for production in networks of 
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shared representations, by which grammatical morphemes are directly 
accessed by many different words. Shared representations can be acquired in 
two ways: complex forms with idiosyncratic meanings are learned as units, 
and high-frequency complex forms are knitted together in the process of 
automatization. 
Although connectionist models have attracted a great deal of attention in 
the fields of both first and second language acquisition recently (Gasser, 1190; 
MacWhinney, 1989; Pinker & Mehler, 1988; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; 
Schmidt, 1988; Sokolik, 1990), there are as yet no published connectionist 
accounts dealing specifically with language fluency. However, a pre-
connectionist interactive strength model proposed by MacKay (1982) deals 
specifically with speech production and addresses the question of flexibility in 
the development of fluency. In contrast to the standard view that automatic 
processes are less flexible than controlled processes, MacKay argues that 
fluency and flexibility are positively correlated and that increased practice 
leads to increased transfer to functionally equivalent actions. In MacKay's 
model, consistent practice strengthens associations among nodes in 
hierarchical networks (for speech, these consist of propositional, conceptual, 
syntactic, lexical, syllable, phonemic, and muscle movement nodes) and 
activating a node at any level of the network primes connected nodes. For all 
multilevel skills, automaticity varies with the level under consideration. 
Learning takes place at the level of abstraction that can benefit most from 
practice and in proportion to the learning that has already taken place at lower 
levels in the hierarchy. For adult native speakers of a language, fluency gains 
take place almost exclusively at the level of the propositional-conceptual 
system (for example, becoming more fluent with practice in discussing new 
and difficult concepts encountered in a new academic discipline), because 
associations at the phonological and muscle movement systems have been 
practiced for a lifetime and are already at maximal strength. The model 
predicts flexibility (transfer) whenever lower level processes have already 
become automatic. Only partial imperfect transfer can be expected when 
writing with the unaccustomed hand, for example, because the component 
muscle movements have received little practice, but the theory predicts a high 
level of transfer in the case of a hi-instrumental musician who practices a piece 
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on one instrument and then plays it on another. 
MacKay's model was supported by a number of experiments in which 
German-English bilinguals translated some sentences from English to German 
and others from German to English during training and then demonstrated 
nearly perfect transfer of skill when translating the same sentences in the 
opposite direction. Kramer, Strayer, and Buckley (1990) specifically contrasted 
the predictions of Logan's instance theory with those of MacKay's model, 
reporting the results of two studies that examined the development and 
transfer of automatic processing in rule-based memory search tasks. For these 
tasks, high positive transfer occurred despite replacement of the exemplars of 
the memory set rules, suggesting that learning was not specific to the instances 
encountered during training. 
Hierarchical strength models make some interesting predictions 
regarding the development of L2 fluency. All such models are sensitive to the 
number of specific examples (lower level components) practiced in connection 
with higher level tasks and are consistent with the claim that a substantial 
amount of experience with item-learning must take place before system 
learning begins (Cruttendon, 1981; Nattinger, 1990). For SLA, a number of 
studies have reported that rule application is sensitive to particular lexical 
items that are frequent and well-practiced (Abraham, 1984; Schmidt & Frota, 
1986). Schmidt & Frota (1986) reported on a beginning learner of Portuguese 
who managed to achieve better than 80% accuracy for the choice of aspectual 
verb forms, but who achieved this through lexical learning (each specific verb 
assigned a consistent aspectual choice) rather than through a productive rule 
that applied equally to all verbs. However, interactive strength theories 
predict that transfer and generalization of skill do take place once a sufficient 
number of specific items have been stored and practiced. The relevant SLA 
studies mentioned above have only reported lexical effects on syntactic 
accuracy; it would be worth investigating whether second language fluency 
also depends on specific examples in the early stages (with faster response 
times for well practiced examples than for less practiced items) but eventually 
comes to be process-based (with no differences between response times for 
well practiced and new items), as MacKay's model predicts. On the other 
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hand, a possible weakness of this particular model is its emphasis on 
linguistically defined levels of production and the claim that fluency is 
achieved bottom-up, which is reminiscent of the audiolingual claim that 
phonological habits must be established first and that manipulation of the 
conceptual level in free expression must be delayed until all lower-level 
processes are well established. This seems falsified by the familiar case of the 
foreign graduate student at an English medium university who is adept at 
manipulation of the conceptual level (for example, in writing) without having 
achieved fluency at the lower component levels of speech production. 
Chunking theories 
The Acr* theory (discussed in an earlier section) proposed a total of five 
learning mechanisms for the development of procedural skill. Anderson (1986) 
subsequently claimed that the knowledge compilation mechanisms of 
proceduralization and composition were sufficient to produce the inductive 
learning for which he had previously used separate mechanisms of 
generalization, discrimination and strengthening. Most recently, Servan-
Schreiber and Anderson (1990) have proposed a theory with a single 
mechanism, competitive chunking (equivalent to composition in the earlier 
account), to account for the empirical results of studies in which subjects 
learned artificial grammars. Servan-Schreiber and Anderson trained subjects 
on exemplar sentences generated by a miniature artificial grammar, finding 
strong support for the hypothesis that the primary mechanism responsible for 
learning was chunking and that grammatical discrimination after training was 
based on the degree to which representations of new strings could be built 
from the collection of learned chunks. The theory assumes that productions 
will be composed or chunked if they follow each other and are linked by goal 
settings. A computer simulation of the chunking theory reproduced the 
experimental results. This was an important demonstration, because it is 
commonly claimed that the result of exposure to the exemplars of an artificial 
grammars is the unconscious (unintentional and unaware) abstraction of the 
underlying rules of the system (Reber, 1967; Reber, Allen & Regan, 1985). 
Newell and Rosenbloom (Newell, 1990; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981; 
Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987) have proposed a theory in which chunking has 
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even more importance as a learning mechanism. The attempt is an ambitious 
one: to construct a unified theory of cognition that posits a single set of 
mechanisms that operate to produce the full range of human cognition, 
including problem solving, decision making, routine action, memory, learning, 
skill, perception, motor behavior, language, motivation, emotion, and 
imagination. Newell and Rosenbloom focus on the power law of practice, 
which appears to hold over the full range of human tasks, from purely 
perceptual skills such as target detection to purely mental tasks such as 
working out geometric proofs. The power law (sometimes referred to as the 
log-linear law) refers to the fact that a plot of the logarithm of the time to 
perform a task against the log of the amount of practice approximates a 
straight line (Anderson, 1982; Carlson, Sullivan, & Schneider, 1989; Logan, 
1990; Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987). The ubiquity of the power law argues that 
there may be a common underlying mechanism responsible for improvement 
in skill on all tasks. Rosenbloom and Newell (1990) argue that chunking is the 
common learning mechanism. Using an artificial intelligence system called 
Soar, which uses production system architecture, Newell (1990) has been able 
to demonstrate that the chunking mechanism can account for the log-linear law 
in the learning of a large number of cognitive skills. 
Language learning was not among the cognitive skills simulated within 
the Soar system (partly because Newell felt that the level of controversy over 
competing views in linguistics made it impossible to establish a set of 
commonly agreed upon facts of learning as the basis for simulation). 
Extensions to the problem of fluency in second language learning must be 
somewhat speculative, but there is some evidence for chunking in SLA. 
Rescorla and Okuda (1987) analyzed data from the first six months of 
acquisition of English by a Japanese speaking child, reporting that Atsuko was 
able to produce a large number of creative and novel referential sentences, but 
accomplished this by using a small number of patterns or modules (rather than 
by composing varied sentences from a large stock of single words), building up 
longer units by chunking the smaller modular components. The fact that the 
Soar model is hierarchical is appropriate for modeling speech production, in 
which an utterance may consist of higher level chunking into clauses and 
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phrases and lower level chunking into words and phonemes (Rosenbloom & 
Newell, 1987). At higher levels of analysis, task descriptions, plans, 
explanations and life stories have also been shown to be tree-structured or 
hierarchically chunked (Linde, 1987). Soar generates chunks that are based on 
lower-level patterns, higher-level (more abstract) patterns, or mixtures, such as 
chunks created from one higher-level pattern and one more primitive pattern. 
This suggests a model for representing the ways in which creative and routine 
elements may vary in fluent speech-for example, when formulaic utterances 
fill slots within a larger discourse pattern (Coulmas, 1981; Hatch, Flashner & 
Hunt, 1986; Hatch & Hawkins, 1987) or when formulaic frames themselves 
have open slots (Hakuta, 1974; Pawley & Syder, 1983). 
General Discussion 
The power law of practice is the most frequently cited characteristic of skill 
development by experimental psychologists, and the ability to account for the 
log-linear function is often considered the most important test of any theory of 
cognitive skill learning. Three of the proposals for the development of 
automatic procedural skill discussed in this paper fail this test. The original 
Shiffrin and Schneider dichotomy between automatic and controlled 
processing, restructuring, and the notion of executive control as incorporated 
in Bialystok's two-dimensional model do not include sufficiently well-specified 
mechanisms to make the relevant predictions. The remaining four proposals 
pass this particular test. Anderson has presented a detailed argument that 
ACT" mechanisms can account for the power law, because the interaction of 
strength dynamics and the characteristics of working memory produce a 
power function which overrides the predicted exponential speedup of 
algorithmic improvement (Anderson, 1982). Other theories predict the power 
law more directly, including the chunking model of Newell and Rosenbloom, 
as discussed above. Instance theory accounts quantitatively for the power-
function speed-up of mean reaction times observed in the skill acquisition, as 
well as the power-function of standard deviations of reaction times (Logan, 
1988a). Strength theories also predict the power law, because if strengthening 
formulas are mapped onto reaction time, speed of responding can be shown to 
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decrease as a power function of practice (Logan, 1991; Cohen, Dunbar, & 
McClelland, 1990). 
One might choose among available theories on other grounds. If the 
objective is to find the richest set of metaphors for describing the development 
of second language fluency, then ACT*, with five mechanisms, may be ideal. 
But if these mechanisms are not all necessary, we may prefer economy of 
description, choosing among theories that rely on a single mechanism 
(memory retrieval, strengthening, or chunking) as long as they account for the 
relevant facts. 4 
For SLA, the crucial question must be which theory and which 
mechanisms best fit the facts of second language fluency and the way in which 
it develops. The following general observations concerning L2 fluency seem 
uncontroversial: 
(1) Speaking is a complex task that requires processing at many different 
levels more or less simultaneously (Rehbein, 1987). Planning and uttering are 
partly accomplished in cycles, but, as Levelt has pointed out, if the language 
processors could not work in parallel, then 1'speaking would be more like 
playing chess: an overt move now and then, but mostly silent processing" 
(Levelt, 1989, p. 27). To the beginning, nonfluent second language learner, 
speaking sometimes does seem to require as much thought and effort as 
planning a chess move. 
(2) It has seemed to most theorists that working memory limitations and 
the speed at which speech is processed in relation to the size of the knowledge 
base underlying it (de Bot, in press) necessitate some concept of automatic 
4 One may also choose among theories on the grounds of the attractiveness of their 
pedagogical implications. These are beyond the scope of this paper, but different theories of 
skill development often do have different practical implications. While the traditional view of 
automaticity stresses the necessity of awareness, attention and controlled practice in the early 
stages if automaticity is to be achieved (O'Malley, Chamot, &: Walker, 1987), instance theory 
takes a different view of the importance of attention (based on assumptions about memory 
encoding and retrieval) and suggests that extended practice is not necessary in principle for 
automatization. What is necessary is having the required knowledge in memory in sufficient 
strength that it can be retrieved, and this can sometimes be achieved by rote memorization if 
the number of facts is small enough (Logan&: Klapp, 1991). Gregg (1984) has cited anecdotal 
evidence from his learning of Japanese that seems to constitute a case for almost immediate 
automatic performance after memorization and very brief practice. 
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processing as the basis for fluency. However, it is better to consider 
components of second language production rather than the task as a whole as 
automatic or nonautomatic. Certain aspects of speaking may become 
automatic (e.g. phonological processing) while others remain nonautomatic 
(conceptual processing in particular). 
(3) Second language fluency develops through practice in a gradual 
fashion, in harmony with the view that the controlled-automatic distinction 
should be viewed as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. The power law of 
practice has not been empirically demonstrated for any of the components of 
second language fluency, but seems a plausible extension of the observation 
that fluency improvement is more easily observable in the early stages of active 
second language use, with a gradual slowing of improvement over time until 
asymptote is reached. 
None of these observations provides grounds for choosing among 
memory-based, strengthening, chunking, or multi-mechanism theories. 
However, there are other aspects of fluent speech which are controversial and 
which mirror controversies in the psychological literature on skill 
development. The most basic disagreement concerns the terminal behavior 
that any theory must explain. Leeson defines fluency as 11the ability of the 
speaker to produce indefinitely many sentences conforming to the 
phonological, syntactical and semantic exigencies of a given natural language 
on the basis of a finite exposure to a finite corpus of that language" (Leeson, 
1975, p. 136). But Pawley and Syder believe that 11memorized sentences and 
phrases are the normal building blocks of fluent spoken discourse, and at the 
same time, that they provide models for the creation of many (partly) new 
sequences which are memorable and in their turn enter the stock of familiar 
usages" (Pawley & Syder, 1983, p. 208). The question is not whether fluent 
native and nonnative speakers can produce novel utterances. They can and do, 
as do nonfluent learners. The important questions are whether novel 
utterances are ever produced as fluently as familiar utterances, without 
attention or effort, and if this does come about, how and when is it 
accomplished in the course of development? 
This strikes to the heart of the major point of disagreement among 
psychological theories of skill development, the relative importance of well-
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practiced, specific items, instances or exemplars for the development of skilled 
performance, as opposed to improvement in performance attributed to the 
increasingly skillful application of abstract rules or algorithms, uninfluenced 
by specific instantiations of the rules (Singley & Anderson, 1989). Fluency 
gains are attributed to the influence of specific examples by the mechanisms of 
proceduralization and composition in the ACT• theory, restructuring as 
discussed by Cheng, instance theory, and the competitive chunking model of 
Servan-Schreiber and Anderson, none of which predict any increase in fluency 
through generalization to new examples. The generalization and 
strengthening mechanisms of ACTJt and strength theories as a general class do 
predict skill-improvement at more abstract levels (Roitblat, 1988), although in 
connectionist models rule-like performance is never independent from the 
exemplars in the knowledge base (Sokolik, 1990). The Newell and Rosenbloom 
chunking mechanism also produces process-improvement at the level of rules 
when implemented in Soar architecture, which uses symbols and abstractions 
and produces implicit generalizations (Newell, 1990). It should be noted, 
however, that there is no currently viable psychological theory that rests upon 
generalization as the sole mechanism of skill development. There is therefore 
little theoretical support from psychology for the common belief that the 
development of fluency in a second language is almost exclusively a matter of 
the increasingly skillful application of rules. 5 
One of the major claims of researchers who have investigated pausal 
phenomena in native speech (Butterworth, 1975, 1989; Chafe, 1980; Goldman-
Eisler, 1964, 1968; Henderson, Goldman-Eisler, & Skarbek, 1966; Levelt, 1989) 
is that the distribution of pausing and speaking in speech reflects an 
alternation between phases in which hesitant speech is due to attentional 
preoccupation with macroplanning while stretches of fluent speech with little 
pausing reflect skilled microplanning which does not require much attention. 
Goldman-Eisler (1964) characterized these speech production cycles in terms of 
5 As commonly practiced, the technique of pattern practice rests on the assumption that short 
training sessions with a small number of exemplars, each of which is typically practiced once, 
will lead to fluency based on automatic rule application. The theories reviewed in this paper 
suggest that unless such practice is very extensive (introducing the boredom factor), neither the 
specific examples practiced nor the general rule will be available subsequently for fluent use. 
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alternation between newly organized speech and old, well organized speech 
consisting of learned sequences and ready-made phrases, with pausal 
phenomena more likely to occur in newly created speech. These ideas have 
been taken up by the Kassel group (Dechert, 1980, 1983: Dechert, Mohle & 
Raupach, 1984; Dechert & Raupach, 1980a, 1980b, 1987; Raupach, 1980, 1984; 
Rehbein, 1987) and applied to a corpus of L1 and L2 samples of speech 
production in German, French and English. One major difference between 
fluent and nonfluent second language learners that emerges across these 
studies is that the nonfluent learner's pauses, false starts and other signs of 
hesitation reflect the need to focus attention on the lower levels of planning, 
whereas fluent learners act more like native speakers in exhibiting hesitation 
primarily as a reflection of integration and macroplanning. 
The role of formulaic speech and chunk learning in these developments is 
less clear. Within the field of SLA, formulaic speech has been investigated 
primarily in early stage learning, motivated by the question of whether or not 
formulaic speech provides a point of initial entry to the productive linguistic 
system (Bohn, 1986; Bolander, 1989; Hakuta, 1974; Krashen & Scarcella, 1978; 
Schmidt, 1983; Schmidt & Frota, 1986; Wong Fillmore, 1979), with some 
attention to the role of formulaicity in pragmatic competence (Blum-Kulka, 
1989; Manes & Wolfson, 1981; Yorio, 1980). There has been comparatively little 
investigation of the possible role of memorized language as a mechanism for 
the production of fluent speech which continues to operate in competition with 
productive rules, under a tacit assumption that once forms have been analyzed 
and some productive use established then all subsequent appearances of the 
forms in question can be taken as productive synthesis by rule-application. It 
is just as possible that, once created, new forms are subsequently stored and 
pulled from memory for subsequent use. Even errors, normally considered the 
best evidence for rule-based productivity, may be stored and retrieved as 
wholes by learners rather than being committed each time as a creative act 
(Platt & MacWhinney, 1983; Schmidt & Frota, 1986). 
Reliance on formulaic speech has often been considered a strategy to 
outperform one's competence and, occasionally, as a crutch to be used in the 
absence of fluency as well (Rehbein 1987), a strategy used to compensate for 
the lack of automatic processing ability. However, Dechert (1983) has 
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proposed that learners must develop lexicalized "islands of reliability'' that 
become the basis for the search processes necessary for the course of planning 
and executing less formulaic speech. Raupach (1984) argues that fluency is 
heavily dependent upon stored chunks, and suggests that second language 
learners may go through several identifiable stages in the development of 
fluency: (1) in the earliest stages, most planning activities take place within 
filled and unfilled pauses; (2) with the adoption of new forms of hesitating 
such as drawled syllables, speech planning activities take place in different 
places and in connection with different islands of reliability; (3) new organizers 
are acquired that lead to a preferred set of formulaic schemata (comparable to 
Pawley and Syder's lexicalized sentence stems); and (4) formulaic islands of 
reliability eventually become integral parts of longer speech stretches. 
Suggestions for Research 
The empirical facts about automatization are well enough established with 
respect to tasks that are amenable to careful laboratory control that 
connectionist and other computational simulations offer the potential for 
resolving disputes concerning the mechanisms assumed to underlie 
automatization. Yet it is unsettling to realize that the mechanisms made 
available by psychological theorizing for understanding second language 
fluency derive primarily from the study of skill in such tasks as typing, the 
detection of target letters in fields of distractors, judgments about digital logic 
gates, alphabet arithmetic, and computer simulations of the same tasks, tasks 
which cannot be assumed to rely necessarily on the same learning mechanisms 
as speaking a second language. 
Whether the investigation of second language fluency itself can contribute 
to identification of the mechanisms underlying it is an unanswerable question 
at this point, because there has been relatively research on the topic. As 
Crookes (1991) has pointed out, the study of second language performance has 
received less attention than that of second language competence, and within 
the language processing field, studies of second language comprehension 
greatly outnumber studies of production. Studies of second language fluency 
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constitute an even smaller subset of production studies, and not many of these 
have been concerned with how fluency develops. Further descriptive studies 
are justified along the lines of Lennon (1990) and Riggenbach (in press), in 
order to establish reliable and valid quantitative measures of fluency. The 
multiple case-study approach used in these studies is particularly 
recommended, because (a) extensive data is required for each language learner 
in order to be able to identify such factors as idiosyncratic formulaic utterances 
and their evolution over time (Raupach, 1984), and (b) there are likely to be 
differences among learners in the ways in which they cope with the demands 
of processing language in real time (Peters, 1983; Skehan, 1991; Wong Fillmore 
1979). In addition, studies that attempt to define the empirical correlates of 
perceived fluency should probably be balanced by introspective reports by 
learners. Language learners cannot introspect the microstructure of automatic 
processes but can say what the focus of their attention is at a particular time, 
can be assumed to be consciousness of underdetermined choice points in the 
flow of action (Baars, 1988), and may have something to contribute to an 
understanding of the interplay of automatic and controlled processing in fluent 
and nonfluent second language speech. 
Such research should not just be exploratory in nature, but needs to 
identify gaps in our current understanding and attempt to fill them. The 
controversy in psychological theorizing concerning the relative importance of 
memory retrieval and speeded computation in skill development raises 
questions that should be investigated with respect to the development of 
second language fluency. The acquisition of general purpose procedures for 
the use of language is sometimes assumed by psychologists to be the main 
evidence against theories emphasizing memory for specific instances. In fact, 
the prevailing practice in SLA has been to assume rule productivity as soon as 
it is possible to do so (as soon as there is evidence of the analysis of chunks or 
productive use), and what is needed is more careful investigation of the 
interplay between routine and creative speech and the relationship of this to 
fluency development. There are many ways in which this can be examined. 
The simplest would be to study the ability of learners to produce target 
language constructions fluently, comparing their performance on items that 
have been practiced with their performance on the same rules with different 
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exemplars. Such research could go beyond Logan's findings from lexical 
decision and alphabet arithmetic tasks by comparing the contribution of 
algorithm speed-up and the retrieval of specific instances on such varied tasks 
as verb inflection (it seems plausible to hypothesize that fluent speakers of 
Spanish may have memorized all the high frequency forms of most verbs) and 
relative clause formation (it is intuitively unlikely that speakers of English 
could have memorized all the relative clauses they have ever produced). 
The problem of the lack of experimental control in second language 
studies cannot be completely overcome, but a research paradigm introduced 
by Hulstijn (1989a, 1989b) can help. Hulstijn has been involved in a series of 
investigations adopting twin experiments, combining a natural L2 learning 
experiment with a semi-artificial experiment using artificial input inserted into 
verbal materials of a natural language. For example, the learning of Dutch 
function words and word order by second language learners (the study of 
which has high validity but limited reliability) can be compared with the 
learning of artificial functional morphemes and word order by native speakers 
of Dutch when these artificial elements are inserted into Dutch sentences (the 
study of which would have limited validity but high reliability). Hulstijn has 
not used the paired experiment paradigm to investigate fluency issues, but it 
could easily be done, for example with respect to the kind of studies mentioned 
above comparing learner performance on previously encountered examples 
with their performance on new realizations of the same rules. An additional 
desirable modification of research methodology in the investigation of fluency 
is greater use of reaction time instead of accuracy as a basic tool of 
measurement, since most accounts of the development of skill make clearer 
predictions concerning processing speed than they do concerning accuracy. 
As yet, we know little about how second language fluency may vary 
under different task demands, in particular interactional contexts, and with 
respect to particular topics, or how fluency develops over time for specific 
tasks and across tasks for younger and older learners, with and without 
instruction. One goal of future research should be to investigate such aspects 
of second language fluency development directly, in order to reduce the degree 
to which our understanding of the mechanisms underlying fluency is 
dependent on theories from other fields. At the present time, this dependence 
126 SCHMIDT 
is almost absolute. It may turn out that such research can also contribute to the 
discussion of current issues raised by general theories of skill development. 
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